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I. HARRIS – A NOT-SO-MODEST PROPOSAL
I rarely disagree with my good friend and colleague, Akram Faizer,
which makes our conversations rather predictable and dull. “You’re so
right!” and “Well said!” can be pleasant and affirming for only so long. So
imagine our delight when we realized that we disagree—passionately—
about a rather unpassionate subject: administrative law. Professor Faizer
teaches it. I practiced it. He supports it. I would like to burn it down.
Well, not quite. I do think some very serious reforms are needed—
reforms that I freely admit, are unlikely to happen. Administrative law is,
* Professors Faizer and Harris are Professors of Law at the LMU Duncan
School of Law in Knoxville, TN. They would like to thank Ann Walsh Long, Head
of Research and Assistant Professor of Law at LMU Law and members of the
Belmont Law Review for all their work in preparing this piece for publication.
They would also like to thank the members of the Belmont Law Review for
inviting them to present at the January 15, 2021 Belmont Law Review Symposium
on Administrative Law, and for their kindness and professionalism throughout.
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for better and worse, an established part of our constitutional landscape. 1
But it shouldn’t be, at least not in its present form.2
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 (the “APA”),3 as
amended and interpreted by the courts, empowers unelected officials to
make, enforce, and adjudicate law with little accountability to the electorate
and very little oversight by the federal courts.4 This is positively
Kafkaesque:5 One is reminded of the The Trial,6 or, perhaps, the famous
line from Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid: “Who are those guys?”7
Fundamentally, the issue is the separation of powers. In Federalist
47, James Madison wrote:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable
with this accumulation of power, or with a mixture of
powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an
accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to
inspire a universal reprobation of the system.8

1. See, e.g., Whitman Trucking’s broad reading of the “intelligible principle”
aspect of the nondelegation doctrine, Whitman v. American Trucking Assocs., 531
U.S. 457 (2001); see also Chevron’s mandate that federal courts must generally
defer to agency decisions, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. I am not alone in thinking so. For a recent and influential discussion of the
many problems with the administrative status quo, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (Univ. Chicago Press 2015). But, of course,
not everyone agrees with Hamburger, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, who answers
Hamburger’s question with the single word, “No.” Adrian Vermeule, Is
Administrative Law Unlawful? By Philip Hamburger. Chicago, Illinois: The
University of Chicago Press, 2014. 648 Pages. $55.00, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547
(2015).
3. Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) [hereinafter APA].
4. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837(citing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (2006)).
5. Franz Kafka’s work is characterized by nightmarish settings in which
characters are crushed by nonsensical, blind authority. Thus, the word Kafkaesque
is often applied to bizarre and impersonal administrative situations where the
individual feels powerless to understand or control what is happening.
6. THE TRIAL (Astor Pictures Corp. 1962).
7. BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID (20th Century Fox 1969).
8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) [hereinafter FEDERALIST 47].
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Madison was not the first to come up with this idea—Montesquieu9 is most
often given credit—but Madison was the first to put it into a written
constitution.10 Indeed, the separation of powers was arguably the most
innovative and important part of the original seven articles of the United
States Constitution.
Then along came emergencies, like the Civil War and the Great
Depression, and more gradual but significant changes, such as the rise of
railroads and interstate commerce. Congress began creating federal
agencies, especially in the 1930s. As concern over these agencies’ powers
grew, the APA11 was eventually born.12
The APA may have been a worthy effort to systematize and
constrain federal agency power, but it did not go far enough: it permitted,
and continues to permit, executive agencies to exercise both legislative13
and judicial14 functions, thereby creating the very tyrannies that
Montesquieu and Madison feared.
The fundamental reform of administrative law is not a liberal or
conservative issue, although it is currently championed by a number of
prominent conservatives who oppose regulations generally and sometimes
call for “deconstruction” of something they call the “Deep State.”15 I insist,
however, that liberals, especially those who favor, e.g., environmental
regulation, and who are concerned about agency capture or presidential
corruption, have just as much reason to oppose the status quo. Power is
power and too much of it is likely to be abused, in one direction or the
other.16
9. Although divided government has been discussed since ancient times, and
arguably implemented in some forms by various states, French Enlightenment
philosopher Baron de Montesquieu is generally credited with identifying the three
basic functions of government and advocating separation of powers on that basis:
“There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body,
whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of
enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of
individuals.” CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 81 (1st
Am. from the 5th London ed. 1802).
10. FEDERALIST 47, supra note 8, at 301.
11. APA, 60 Stat. 237.
12. DANIEL HALL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY
(Pearson 2020).
13. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)–(5) (2006).
14. Id. § 551(6)–(7).
15. Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1653 (2018); see also Virgil, The Deep State Becomes the Obvious State,
BREITBART (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2020/09/28/virgilthe-deep-state-becomes-the-obvious-state/ [https://perma.cc/LLD8-R5NU].
16. Okay, I guess I have to quote Lord Acton, "Power tends to corrupt and
absolute power corrupts absolutely." Letter from Lord Alfred Acton to Mandell
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Therefore, I propose what I admit is a radical solution: take away
agency rulemaking and adjudicative authority from executive agencies and
return these powers to Congress and the federal courts.
Rulemaking can be fixed statutorily by requiring congressional
enactment of proposed agency regulations. Similarly, adjudication can be
fixed through a federal statute that deauthorizes all quasi-judicial authority
in executive agencies and replaces administrative law judges with an
expanded federal judiciary.17
If my proposal were adopted, Congress, aided by agency expertise
but accountable to the people, would enact laws. Executive agencies would
enforce them. And aggrieved parties would have access to impartial, lifetenured judges in the Federal Judiciary to resolve any resulting disputes.
Just as James Madison intended.18
II. FAIZER – A DETAILED REBUTTAL
My friend and LMU Law colleague Stewart Harris’s position is
ostensibly summed up by the father of our constitution, James Madison,
whose creation enshrined the separation of powers vesting by legislative
power in the Congress, executive power in the President, and judicial power
in the federal courts.19 But these powers were never intended to be entirely
Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), reprinted in LORD ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND
POWER 364 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1957). On a more positive note, I’ll also quote
Spiderman’s gentle Uncle Ben, “With great power comes great responsibility,”
SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002). Hmm. As an interim measure, perhaps we
should post Spiderman posters all throughout the federal bureaucracy.
17. In general, the enforcement functions of most agencies present no
separation-of-powers issue, at least when those agencies are firmly located within
the executive branch, so my proposal leaves them with all of their current executive
powers. Independent agencies that exist outside the three branches of the national
government, somewhere in the ether, I suppose, present constitutional issues that
lie beyond the scope of this article. But their constitutionality is also wellestablished: Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)
(“The authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of
executive control cannot well be doubted, and that authority includes, as an
appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall continue in
office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the meantime.”).
18. FEDERALIST 47, supra note 8, at 301.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art II, § 1 (“The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”);
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.”). Examples of power overlap include that of
impeachment and removal of executive and judicial officials, the President’s power
to veto duly enacted Congressional legislation, the Congress’s power to, in turn,
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separate, a point Madison famously made in the Federalist Papers and
which is acknowledged by the Constitution’s deliberate decision to overlap
separate spheres of competence in crucial areas.20 As Wurman has written,
“[t]he brilliance of the constitutional design was that although the powers
would be separate, they would not be entirely separate. Each branch would
have some hand in the exercise of power by the others, its own ambitions
and institutional interests serving as checks on those of the other
branches.”21
Two issues are before us. First, is the modern American
administrative state consistent with Madison’s constitutional framework?
Second, regardless of its compatibility with Madisonian principles, is it
desirable? After all, many aspects of Madison’s constitutional design are
flawed. Its countenance of slavery was a crime both then and now and its
archaic and Byzantine amendment procedure has led inexorably to judicial
activism and the hyper-politicization of the judicial branch. Before we go
any further, a detailed and forthright defense of administrative law, the
administrative procedure act, and Chevron Deference is required.
A. Administrative Law and the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative law can be defined as the law of the government.
Although it might sound tautological at first reading, it actually is quite
profound because its enunciated goal is to legally constrain government
employees charged with enforcing duly enacted laws consistent with the
U.S. Constitution. Indeed, though much is made of our system of checks
and balances, this Presidential Administration has evidenced that the
constitutional framework is an insufficient check on maladministration.
Examples of this include the inordinately high threshold for removing a
President from office and how this has facilitated Presidential impunity in
office and evidenced that the Courts and media lack the resources, political
capital, and institutional legitimacy to deter Presidential abuses of power. It
is true that maladministration is constrained by political culture. For
example, our political culture would definitely preclude a President from
even contemplating a directive to kill a political rival, as is the case with
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and the obvious poisoning of his political
rival Alexei Navalny.
However, political cultures evolve and the sad reality is that nearly
all western democracies have seen a startling degree of democratic
retrogression and authoritarianism seep into their political cultures since the
override a Presidential veto, the Senate’s power to ratify treaties and confirm
Presidential high executive officials.
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
[hereinafter FEDERALIST 51]; FEDERALIST 47, supra note 8, at 321–22.
21. Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 369
(2017).
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Cold War and the attendant increase in global migration.22 The many
reasons for this are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that,
though constraining at times, political culture is not a fixed concept that
ensures a democracy remains faithful to the rule of law. More is needed,
especially since, as Francis Fukuyama has persuasively demonstrated,
countries, unless forced to go through a process of institutional renewal,
tend to succumb to institutional sclerosis and the patrimonial trap.23 The
patrimonial trap refers to the natural tendency to prioritize the well-being of
one’s family over the broader society.24
According to Fukuyama, this lamentable reality, was first overcome
by the world’s first great civilization, Imperial China, which created a
government structure that rewarded merit over birthright and developed
institutions, such as a professional civil service, to insure against
patrimonial mediocrity.25 Institutional sclerosis refers to the tendency of
interest groups to, over time, effectively control state institutions and
eventually undermine institutional renewal and overall well-being by using
their relative power to veto needed change.26 This is what has happened in
the U.S. and other mature democracies since the Cold War’s end. To
illustrate its consequences, compare the Kennedy Administration’s “Best
and Brightest” with the “Friends and Family” Trump Administration. Or,
more broadly, compare the equalization and integration of public schooling
that began with Brown v. Board27 and continued, albeit at snail’s pace, until
the mid-1980s, with the schooling framework we see today due to growing
socioeconomic inequality that commenced with the Reagan tax cuts of
1981.28 With respect to institutional sclerosis, compare the U.S. Senate’s
relative bipartisan approach to foreign policy and the confirmation of
Presidential cabinet secretaries and judicial nominees during the Cold War
with today’s scorched earth partisanship.29
22. Examples include the rise of authoritarian populism in the United States;
the United Kingdom with Brexit; France with the collapse of the traditional
political parties and the rise of the Le Front National; Italy with the rise to power of
a far-right populist government; far-right governments in Poland and Hungary; and,
of course, China’s move away from a relatively pluralistic CCP to an authoritarian
cult of personality under President Xi.
23. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY: FROM
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY (Profile
Books 2015).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education
Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287 (2013).
29. See for example the U.S. Senate’s confirmation of former Judge Antonin
Scalia to be an associate Justice on the Supreme Court by a U.S. Senate vote of 980 in 1986 as compared to the U.S. Senate’s refusal to grant a confirmation hearing
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According to Fukuyama, political order in liberal democracies,
such as the U.S., rests on three pillars: political accountability, a strong
effective state, and the rule of law.30 Accountability involves making rulers
responsive to electorates, which means not only free and fair multiparty
elections but institutions of accountability supplemented by a central
government that can get things done with rules and regulations that apply
equally to everyone.31 U.S. political development has gone into reverse
becoming weaker, less efficient, and more corrupt.32 One cause of the
weakening political order is growing economic inequality and the
geographic concentration of wealth, which has allowed elites to purchase
immense political power and manipulate the system to further their own
interests.33 Another cause is the permeability of American political
institutions to interest groups, allowing an array of factions that “are
collectively unrepresentative of the public as a whole” to exercise
disproportionate influence and, in effect, control the government.34 The
result, according to Fukuyama, is a vicious cycle whereby the government
is rendered incapable or unwilling to deal with national problems in a way
that breeds a cynicism in the electorate that, in turn, leads to the state being
starved of resources and authority, which leads to even poorer
performance.35
Fukuyama’s thesis is that although liberal democracy is the best
form of government, it is, absent continuous reform, susceptible to the
patrimonial trap, institutional decay, and sclerosis. This is what currently
bedevils the U.S. government, which has failed to address a growing trend
of socioeconomic immobility and low voter turnout that has undermined the
quality of American democracy and vitiated the rule of law.36 It is what
happened at the turn of the previous century when the concentrated power
of trusts and local corporate interests exploited traditional social hierarchies
to undermine individual freedom and the liberty enhancing promise of the
Madisonian framework, namely federalism. Government had become
to President Obama’s nominee to replace Justice Scalia, Judge Merrick Garland,
after Scalia died unexpectedly in February 2016.
30. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 23.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2014),
http://dowbor.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/14Thomas-Piketty.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R4BR-8BJH] (demonstrating that socioeconomic mobility in the
United States has dropped dramatically with growing income and wealth
inequality); see also M. Akram Faizer, The Privileges of Immunities Clause; A
Potential Cure for the Trump Phenomenon, 121 PENN. St. L. REV. 61, 93 (2016).
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sclerotic and institutionally incapable of ensuring the majority of
Americans have the ability to fully participate in all aspects of American
life. The enactment of progressive social welfare legislation and
administrative rules, designed to move the government away from
patronage in the direction of professionalism and independence, enabled
Americans from heterodox backgrounds to find acceptance and opportunity
that had, hitherto, been lacking.37 Thanks to administrative law enactments,
the public interest was finally given a voice when challenged by organized
corporate and business interests that would otherwise use their lopsided
power to overwhelm what previously had been a sclerotic and incapable
federal government.
While opponents of administrative law are nostalgic for an era of
small government, it is useful to remind oneself that it was not
administrative law that grew government. That was a direct concomitant of
industrialization and capitalism on a continental scale, as well as the U.S.’s
emergency as an industrial and military superpower. Opponents of the
administrative state, who call for its deconstruction, argue that anything that
deviates from a Schoolhouse Rock narrative is constitutionally infirm and
undemocratic.38 Schoolhouse Rock, after all, never mentions anything about
the administrative state. This is for a good reason—it is a cartoon written
for school-aged children.
As Rahman has written, the upheavals of industrialization
generated not only economic dislocation, but provoked a deep political
crisis because late nineteenth century thinkers, lawyers, and reformers saw
industrial capitalism as a “fundamental threat to existing institutions and
political ideals” because it, aided by a recalcitrant federal judiciary, created
new forms of corporate power that tended to capture, corrupt, or otherwise
immobilize existing institutions of government.39 This, in turn, spawned
social movements across the country that sought new institutions and
governing frameworks to both empower the broader public and provide a
check against the excesses of industrialization.40 The issue that confronted
37. What I mean by this is access to schools, colleges, universities,
government, workplaces, businesses and places of public accommodation. I also
mean the provision public goods such as national parks, environmental protections,
clean air, clean water, etc.
38. See, e.g., Steve Bannon’s call for deconstruction of the administrative
state. Gregory Krieg, What the ‘Deconstruction of the Administrative State’ Really
Looks Like, CNN POLITICS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/
politics/trump-bannon-administrative-state/index.html [https://perma.cc/EJ9H-2M
CL].
39. K. Sabeel Rahman, Book Review: Reconstructing the Administrative State
in an Era of Economic and Democratic Crisis: Constitutional Coup:
Privatization’s Threat to the American Republic by Jon D. Michaels, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1671, 1683 (2018).
40. Id. at 1684.
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Progressive era and New Deal technocrats was the problem created by
industrial economic power in the hands of the few that shaped market
forces and altered the culture without either the checks and balances or
norms of public justification that typically accompany the use of
governmental power. Rahman, convincingly, writes that the administrative
state and administrative law, which implements checks and balances to
assure accountability, legitimacy, and non-arbitrariness, is not solely about
checking government power to accommodate the modern American state to
founding principles, which were, even in Madison’s time, belied by slavery,
gender
hierarchy,
concentrated
corporate
power,
legislative
malapportionment, and a Byzantine amendment procedure. The checks and
balances we find in administrative law are there to preserve what Rahman
labels the “deeper mission of modern democracy” by enabling people “to
effectively remake social and economic systems that are beyond the scope
of individuals, associations, or ordinary common law” to address
substantive challenges of “systemic economic and social inequality and
exclusion.”41
Progressive reformers and those who drafted the Administrative
Procedure Act sought to accommodate the necessary growth of government
in a manner consistent with both pluralism and the rule of law and did this
by constraining government civil servants by means other than political
culture alone. The goal was for civil servants and the administrative
agencies in which they worked to address the complexities of the modern
economy and industrial society by harnessing their expertise,
professionalism, and independence to serve the public interest.42
According to Jon Michaels, the administrative state encapsulated
by the APA is nothing less than an attempt to provide legal structure to an
endeavor designed to balance expertise, public participation, and
presidential oversight.43 Michaels calls it, an “administrative separation of
powers,” i.e., the tripartite system of presidential appointment, independent
civil service, and public participation through notice-and-comment and
other means. This provides tools to guard against tyranny, and complement
the original Madisonian division of executive legislative and judicial
functions within the administrative state.44 Under this framework, appointed
agency heads and cabinet secretaries stand in for the Executive, the civil
service acts as an impartial adjudicator of agency actions, and civil society
41. Id. at 1675–76.
42. Id. at 1671 (quoting Dean Joshua Landis of the Harvard Law School who
declared in 1938, that the administrative process “is, in essence, our generation’s
answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and legislative process” because unlike
generalist legislatures or formalist judges, administrative agencies could address
the complexities of the modern economy and industrial society by harnessing their
expertise, professionalism and independence to serve the public interest).
43. Id. at 1679.
44. Id.
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participation in notice-and-comment and beyond provides public input in a
manner akin to a democratic legislature.45 Dismantling the administrative
state, according to Michaels and Rahman, would facilitate unchecked and
authoritarian executive power by removing necessary pluralism protecting
procedural norms that guide agency conduct. A recent example is
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal,46 which
relied on the Administrative Procedure Act to invalidate the Trump
Administration’s procedurally infirm and authoritarian attempt to rescind
President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)
deportation deferral program. Procedurally infirm policy changes, driven by
an authoritarian-minded White House and facilitated by a supine Congress,
would resuscitate hegemony and factionalism by resurrecting traditional
cultural and economic hierarchies from a bygone era.47 This perhaps
explains the true motive behind those who question the administrative state.
Former White House chief strategist Steve Bannon has called for the
deconstruction of the administrative state. He did so, most likely, based on
instinctive awareness that such a result would shift the balance of “social,
political and economic power” to make it harder to contest traditional
hierarchies that have historically undermined national cohesion and are the
hallmark preferences of authoritarians worldwide.
Recognizing that Professor Harris is an extremely well-intentioned
progressive, I must first acknowledge that he does not recommend
deconstruction of the administrative state. Rather, he takes issue with
agency rulemaking in general and would have Congress enact legislation
that would guide agency behavior with sufficient clarity and flexibility to
govern a continent-sized superpower. Requiring this much more from
Congress is clearly a nonstarter. First, 535 Congresspersons lack the
resources and skill to write legislation in this manner. Professor Harris’s
proposal would unintentionally take the country back to the regressive
framework of the Gilded Age. A foreboding counterfactual is evident with
respect to Boeing, which pressured Congress and the Trump White House
to work in tandem to undermine the Federal Aviation Administration’s
(“FAA”) regulatory authority by way of the FAA Reauthorization Act. The
Act purported to streamline the certification process for new technologies
and therefore make Boeing more competitive with its European rival,
Airbus. Problematically, though, it effectively gutted the FAA’s ability to
45. Id.
46. Department of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18587, slip op. at 26 (591 U.S. ___ (2020)) (concluding that the Trump
Administration’s attempted revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals program initiated by Executive Order by President Obama failed to satisfy
hard look review because there was nothing in the administrative record
demonstrating DHS considered all the alternatives before it prior to issuing a
rescission order).
47. Rahman, supra note 39, at 1674.
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act as a regulator by forcing it to outsource its oversight obligations to
Boeing itself.48 Boeing’s subsequent failure to train provide proper software
for operation of its Boeing 737 Supermax airplane resulted in the Lion Air
Flight 610 crash on October 29, 2018, the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302
crash on March 10, 2019, and President’s Trump’s eventual nationwide
grounding of the 737 Supermax on March 13, 2019, after the FAA failed to
act, notwithstanding an international consensus to ground the plane.
Depriving agencies of their power to issue legislative rules under the APA
will only undermine government competence and worsen the problem of
regulatory capture, exemplified by the Boeing example.
Professor Harris next takes issue with the deference currently given
by the courts to agency rulemakings, adjudications, and enforcements. For
purposes of traditional legislative rulemaking, subject to public
participation, this is known as Chevron deference after the canonical (or
anti-canonical depending on one’s ideological inclination) U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Chevron U.S.A v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc.49 Professor Harris would then seek to democratically legitimize all
agency rulemaking by requiring them to be approved via bicameralism and
presentment prior to enactment. He takes this position in good faith, I
suspect naively, in view of the sheer volume of rulemakings and
unbelievable demands already made of the nation’s 535 Congressmembers.
Finally, Professor Harris objects to agency adjudications and the
requirement that agency litigants exhaust administrative remedies prior to
commencing suit in an Article III court. Instead, he would eliminate all
internal agency adjudications, having all federal adjudications commence in
the nation’s 94 U.S. District Courts, with no deference given to the agency
by the court. Once again, Professor Harris’s position is well-intentioned,
but naïve. First, he misunderstands the reasons for agency deference. It is
not to facilitate a power grab by the executive branch’s agencies and
undermine Article III’s Vesting Clause. Rather, it accommodates agency
expertise to effectuate broad Congressional rulemaking delegations
consistent with the rule of law because agencies, unlike Article III courts,
are politically accountable to Congress via the budgetary process and the
Presidential Administration via its power to staff agencies and subordinate
agency action to its policy preferences. Ending agency deference will not
resuscitate American democracy by improving legislation or revitalizing a
moribund judiciary. Instead it will further the process of institutional
sclerosis already eating away at the nation’s democratic norms.

48. Natalie Kitroeff & David Gelles, Before Deadly Crashes, Boeing Pushed
for Law that Undercut Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/business/boeing-737-max-crashes.html
[https://perma.cc/LP83-639L].
49. Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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Professor Harris takes a very formalistic view of both separation
and powers and democratic accountability. Under this approach, democracy
is served by limiting agency deference doctrines. It is the elected members
of Congress who should be enacting the legislative rules we live under, not
unelected civil servants. In response, proponents of the administrative state
argue the administrative process, when compared to the congressional
analogue, is particularly well-suited to receive and process political inputs
from a broad range of civil society. For example, as far back as 1985, Jerry
Mashaw argued the President’s ability to influence agency policy choices
made agency action more politically accountable than legislation.50 This, in
turn, renders broad Congressional statutory delegations more politically
legitimate than narrower ones that leave less room for administrative
interpretation.51 Mashaw’s position effectively rebuts Professor Harris’s
claim that ending rulemaking delegation would be more democratic.
Concomitantly, the much-maligned agency deference doctrines are, as
detailed below, more democratically legitimate because elected Presidents
can guide agency actions. Congressional rulemaking delegation to
politically accountable agencies is clearly preferable than heightened
judicial scrutiny by politically unaccountable Article III judges who lack
the resource base, expertise, and legitimacy to effectuate such a framework.
It is to the subject of agency deference doctrines that this paper now turns.
B. Chevron and the Importance of Agency Deference
With the case for the administrative state and administrative law
now made, the issue is whether reviewing federal courts owe any deference
to administrative rulemakings, enforcement actions, and adjudications. We
can easily accept that agencies, as a matter of necessity, must interpret
Congressional statutes.52 Ideally, the statutes are written using language that
is so precise and unambiguous that agencies know exactly what to do in the
rulemaking process.53 As Siegel has noted, since justiciability and
administrative law principles normally ensure that a court will have an
opportunity to encounter such a statute only after the agency has taken

50. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 81–82 (1985).
51. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2333–34 (2001) (“In defending broad delegations, [Professor] Mashaw contended
that more extensive bureaucratic, as opposed to legislative, decision making
actually would improve the connection between governmental action and electoral
wishes.”).
52. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
53. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71
VAND. L. REV. 937, 943 (2018).
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some action under it.54 Accordingly, by the time an Article III court has
occasion to interpret a statute administered by a federal agency, the agency
itself will typically have given some construction to the statute.55 Going
back to at least the nineteenth century, federal courts gave, what Siegel
describes as, “respectful consideration” or “great respect” for an agency’s
construction of a statute it administered.56 The agency’s construction was,
however, not controlling. The final interpretive power rested with the
courts, such that courts were empowered to enforce their own interpretation
of a statute if it differed from that of an administering agency.57 As late as
1983–the year before Chevron–the Court reiterated the view that an agency
interpretation of a statute is not controlling on the reviewing court.58
Chevron involved the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”)
definition of the term “stationary sources” under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977.59 The statute required “new or modified major
stationary sources” of air pollution to comply with certain permit
requirements, and authorized the EPA to define the relevant terms by
regulation.60 The EPA, at first, determined that “stationary source” referred
to each individual piece of pollution-emitting equipment.61 After the
Reagan Administration took office in 1981, the EPA issued a new
definition, after notice and comment, that changed its position and
construed “stationary source” to mean an entire plant. This allowed firms to
avoid permit requirements by offsetting the emissions from new equipment
with reduced emissions from old equipment in the same plant.62 After the
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 944.
57. Id. at 943–44.
58. Id. at 944 (citing Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 635 (1983)).
59. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(1997).
60. Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840
(1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)). The permit requirements applied to states
that had not attained national ambient air quality standards. Among other things, a
new or modified source must comply with the “lowest achievable emission rate,”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7503(2)), and the applicant must show that all of the other
sources under its control within the nonattainment state have complied with
applicable emissions standards.
61. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 619–20 (1996).
62. Id. at 620, note 42 (after the Reagan Administration took office in 1981,
the EPA promulgated the new definition after notice and comment); see 5 U.S.C. §
553. The EPA’s reasoning was as follows: The permit requirement was triggered,
in relevant part, by the installation of a “new” or “modified” “stationary source.”
40 C.F.R. § 52 (2020). If an entire plant were a “stationary source,” then merely
adding a new piece of equipment would not add a “new” source. Moreover, the Act
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D.C. Circuit invalidated the rule, on the grounds it was inappropriate for a
legislative scheme designed to improve air quality, the Supreme Court, in a
decision by Justice Stevens, reversed. The Supreme Court concluded the
statutory text was ambiguous, the legislative history was silent on the
precise issue, and the general statutory purpose of improving air quality was
too broad and self-contradictory to be decisive, i.e., the reviewing court was
bound to accept the EPA’s “reasonable accommodation of manifestly
competing interests.”63
Chevron concluded when a court reviews a federal agency’s
interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering, it must follow a
two-step process.64 In Step One, the court must ask whether the statute at
issue unambiguously addresses the precise question.65 If so, both the court
and the agency are bound by Congress’s clear textual mandate. It is
reversible error for an agency to do otherwise.66 If, however, the governing
statute is “silent or ambiguous” as to the specific agency rule at issue, the
reviewing court is to move to Step Two. In Step Two, the court will uphold
the agency’s construction of the statute so long as it is reasonable or
permissible, regardless of whether the court believes it was the best
application.67 This is based on the supposition that statutory ambiguity
implicitly delegates legislative power to the agency.68 Perhaps the best
known legal scholar among Chevron’s critics is the eminent academician
and public intellectual Philip Hamburger, who has influenced both Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch. Hamburger argues that Chevron is incompatible with
the courts’ Article III duty to interpret the law impartially, and, in the case
of broad Congressional delegations, violative of Article I’s requirement that
legislative power be vested in Congress and not the executive branch.69 In
short, Hamburger and Chevron’s critics posit that agency deference violates

defined a “modification” as a change that “increases the amount of any air pollutant
emitted by such source or [that] results in the emission of any air pollutant not
previously emitted.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). If an entire plant were a “stationary
source,” a firm could add or modify individual pieces of equipment without
“modifying” the source, provided that it offset new emissions with equivalent
reductions from other equipment in the plant. The EPA reasoned that such an
approach would permit firms to update their plants with cleaner equipment, without
triggering a heavy permit requirement. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 858–59. The new
approach also allowed the agency to simplify its rules in important respects. See id.
63. Manning, supra note 61, at 620.
64. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 844.
68. Id.
69. See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); Siegel, supra
note 53, at 952–53.
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the Madisonian constitutional structure and therefore poses an immediate
threat to individual liberty.
Although Hamburger certainly has a sophisticated understanding of
the subject, his characterization of agency deference as violative of Article
III’s vesting clause is altogether incredible. After all, the federal courts, as a
matter of judicial doctrine, already take a deferential approach to
socioeconomic legislation when challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.70 Going further, the federal courts,
once again as a doctrinal matter, defer to the elected branches of
government when adjudicating matters involving national security and
military defense,71 and justiciability doctrines are consistently applied to
enable courts to defer to the political branches. To illustrate, the Supreme
Court recently concluded that partisan legislative districting, which dilutes
citizen voting power and political speech, constitutes a nonjusticiable
political question that is outside the competence of the federal courts.72
Would Hamburger and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch seriously contend the
Court’s justiciability doctrines violate Article III’s Vesting Clause?
Hamburger’s claim that Chevron violates the separation of powers
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, more broadly, is
also shortsighted and underinclusive. After all, Madison’s constitutional
framework gives the President a hand in legislative matters by means of
presentment and veto; the legislature a hand in executive power by means
of Reconsideration by two-thirds vote of each house, a further say in
executive power by concurring in Treaties and providing Advice and
Consent to the appointment of “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States,” as well as Congress’s power to Impeach and Convict the
“President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States,” for
“Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors;” and, of
course, the President’s power in judicial matters “to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offences [sic] against the United States.”73 The Constitution’s
deliberate decision to elide ostensibly separate spheres of competence gives
“[e]ach branch . . . some hand in the exercise of power by the others, its
own ambitions and institutional interests serving as checks on those of the
other branches.”74 This principal is clearly carried forward by both the
70. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41–42
(1973); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
71. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 58 (2006); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1981)
(discussing the Court’s deference to Congress in military affairs). See generally
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (failing to find standing for
challengers to the 2008 amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).
72. Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, slip op. at 30 (U.S. June 27, 2019).
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 7; U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 4.
74. Wurman, supra note 21, at 369.
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Administrative Procedure Act and its elucidation, in the case of informal
rulemaking, of Chevron deference.
This deference is consistent with the Article III Vesting Clause,
given that the federal courts consistently defer to the political branches in a
whole host of areas. Moreover, per Henry Monaghan and later John
Manning, binding deference is a function of Congress’s modern authority to
delegate broad legislative discretion to administrative agencies, such that
politically accountable administrators have substantial responsibility for
specifying the particulars of open-ended federal statutes.75 This argument
for broad rather than narrow delegations, as adumbrated by Justice
Rehnquist and subsequently authoritatively demonstrated by Mashaw and
Elena Kagan, is actually more, not less, consistent with democratic
accountability. Presidential administrations are, unlike individual members
of Congress, elected by a majority of the Electoral College and therefore,
typically, by a plurality of the voting public. Congressmen, by contrast,
tend to be elected based on parochial local interests and partisan
districting.76 Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n, could well have been applied to Chevron. He writes:
[a] change in administration brought about by the people
casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of
its programs and regulations. As long as the agency
remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is
entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate
priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.77
Consequently, to borrow from John Manning, following Chevron, the
reviewing court asks whether agency action–usually the promulgation of a
rule, but sometimes an agency enforcement action, or an adjudication–is
consistent with an authorizing statute. In such a circumstance, if the
reviewing court is effectively bound by the agency’s statutory
75. Manning, supra note 61, at 617, 621.
76. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Insur.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
Mashaw, supra note 50, at 95–96; Kagan, supra note 51, at 2311, 2332, 2383 (in
defending broad delegations, Mashaw contends that more extensive bureaucratic,
as opposed to legislative, decision making actually would improve the connection
between governmental action and electoral wishes in view of the executive
branch’s responsiveness to a nationwide electorate, while Kagan argues for a
Presidential administration being able to subordinate the regulatory agenda of
“executive branch agencies” to the President’s stated “policy and political
agenda”).
77. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 57 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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interpretation, “separation remains between the relevant lawmaker
(Congress) and at least one entity (the agency) with independent authority,
subject to political accountability, to interpret the legal text.” In short,
Chevron maintains a noteworthy separation of lawmaking from law
exposition. Manning writes:
Three sources suggest that our constitutional structure
places exceptionally high value on an effective separation
of lawmaking from law-exposition at some point in the
chain of governance. First, the separation of lawmaking
from law-exposition explicitly figures in a central way in
the Constitution’s careful scheme of structural protections.
Second, the intellectual traditions underlying our
constitutional structure emphasize such separation as a way
of controlling arbitrary government. Third, even in the era
of modern administration, the Court strictly enforces that
norm of separation by insisting upon a separation of
congressional lawmaking from executive and judicial
implementation of federal statutes.78
Manning goes further, attacking the claim that Chevron enables Congress to
abdicate its obligation to legislate under Article I, Section 7 and the obvious
concern the Framers had about separating law making from law exposition.
He writes:
Although, in some sense, any form of delegation creates
“legislative” policy without bicameralism and presentment,
congressional control over its own delegations of power
poses too grave a threat to that deliberative process, and
hence is unconstitutional per se. If, however, Congress
delegates authority to another branch, there is an inherent
structural check on Congress’s ability to leave its policies
undefined. Specifically, when Congress uses imprecision or
vagueness to avoid the costs of investigating and agreeing
on the precise policies it wishes to adopt, it does so only at
the expense of ceding control over the particulars of its
program to another branch of government. Of course, as
Chevron itself illustrates, even with that structural
incentive, Congress will at times, consciously or
unconsciously, enact imprecise or vague laws that leave
crucial legislative policies unspecified. Still, the separation
of lawmaking from law-exposition constrains such a
tendency, providing at least some degree of protection for
78. Manning, supra note 61, at 639.
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bicameralism and presentment. If Congress omits to
specify its policies clearly during the process of
bicameralism and presentment, it does so only at the price
of forfeiting its power of policy specification to a separate
expositor beyond its immediate control.79
Chevron is defensible not only because it addresses the Framers’
concern to separate lawmaking from law exposition, but by deferring to
politically accountable agencies, as opposed to politically non-responsive
Article III judges; it is doctrinally more consistent with democratic
pluralism and the rule of law. Beyond that, Chevron undoubtedly enhances
the quality of American government by facilitating better policy outcomes
based on agency expertise and enabling the federal courts to save scarce
judicial resources for more pressing matters. Reversing Chevron will, if
anything, undermine the responsiveness of American government and
further the problem of democratic retrogression and authoritarianism. It will
also, by ostensibly empowering the federal courts to adjudicate
rulemakings, enforcement actions, and adjudications, de novo, further
politicize the federal judiciary to the detriment of its institutional legitimacy
and undermine national cohesion.80
An obviously problematic adumbration of a Chevron reversal is
King v. Burwell. 81 King dealt with the legality of the IRS’s continued
provision of tax credits for health policies purchased on both state and
federal exchanges under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 (“ACA”), when the statutory text mandated provision of tax credits
for policies purchased only on state exchanges (“IRS Rule”). In King, the
Chief Justice rejected the use of Chevron and concluded that no deference
should be granted to administrative rulemaking provisions such as this,
which are of central importance to a statutory scheme.82 His decision,
however, upheld the IRS Rule on the grounds that its invalidation would
have undermined the insurance marketplaces, which Congress could not
have intended in enacting a law designed to provide universal health
insurance.83
Perhaps, in King, the Chief Justice ingeniously found a means to
narrow the power of administrative agencies without jeopardizing the
Court’s institutional legitimacy with political and jurisprudential liberals.
79. Id. at 653–54. .
80. For example, the U.S. Senate’s abject failure to consider President
Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court;
conservative support for President Trump based on their goal to controlling the
federal courts ideologically; and, most recently, the parlous spectacle of the Justice
Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate.
81. See King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 8 (574 U.S. ___ (2015)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 7, 21.
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More likely, he chose a mode of analysis that empowered the federal courts
at the expense of agencies, thereby problematically politicizing the
judiciary without increasing the scope of its institutional competence or
resource base. The King outcome did not earn plaudits from conservatives
thankful that the Chief Justice abjured Chevron when analyzing the IRS
Rule. Rather, conservatives denounced the Chief Justice as a closet liberal,
intent on saving the ACA regardless of the consequences.84 Justice Scalia,
no less, claimed the result to be so “absurd” that the ACA should now be
called “SCOTUSCare” based on the Court’s use of “somersaults of
statutory interpretation” to save the ACA from judicial invalidation.85 If
anything, rejecting Chevron and applying the “central importance to the
statutory scheme” test will only further politicize the judiciary and
undermine its independence.
Chevron should not be reversed. It enables administrative law to
serve its intended goal of updating American institutions, avoiding
institutional sclerosis by enabling Congress to enact legislation that is
legitimately enforced by competent and politically accountable
administrators with the expertise to do so. It avoids administrative oligarchy
by requiring tentative rulemakings to undergo notice and comment under
APA 553 before issuing final rules and, in the event of judicial review, a
requirement that the agency satisfy “hard look” review under the arbitrary
and capricious framework, which requires that the agency demonstrate that
its decisions are fully supported in the record before the reviewing court.86
Under the Chevron framework, Congress enacts legislation that delegates
rulemaking authority to a politically accountable agency, and the agency
writes the relevant rulemaking consistent with the statute. This rulemaking,
which is democratically legitimated by the express rulemaking delegation
from Congress, is further legitimized by incorporation of public input via
notice and comment with subsequent judicial review to insure that the final
rulemaking is consistent with the authorizing legislation and has considered
the received public comments. This delegation framework is democratically
legitimate and leads to better government outcomes because agencies have
84. See John Yoo, Opinion, Chief Justice Roberts and His Apologists, WALL
ST. J., June 30–July 1, 2012, at A15; WTH is Going on with the Supreme Court?
John Yoo on the DACA Decision and the Dangerous Implications for Executive
Power, AEI (July 29, 2020), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/7.29
.20-John-Yoo-transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/67Y4-RQWT].
85. King, slip op. at 1, 21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., Department of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. 18-597, slip op. at 8–9, 23, 25, 26 (591 U.S. ___(2020)) (concluding that the
Trump Administration’s attempted revocation of the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program initiated by Executive Order by President Obama
failed to satisfy hard look review because there was nothing in the administrative
record demonstrating DHS considered all the alternatives before it prior to issuing a
rescission order).
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greater expertise and specialized knowledge in their jurisdictional area than
either Congress or the courts. Broader delegations to the executive branch
are consistent with democratic accountability, in that the President is
elected by a majority of the Electoral College to implement a regulatory
framework consistent with the President’s policy objectives. It is also
because agency deference empowers politically accountable agencies over
courts which are designed to be unaccountable. Professor Harris’s approach
would inadvertently impose a crabbed reading of the Constitution to
undermine American governmental capacity. In the long run, this will
further the trend toward democratic retrogression and authoritarianism.
One proposal, that is well outlined in a previous piece I authored,
recommends increasing the number of and improving the means of electing
Representatives from single member plurality districts to a form of
proportional representation, as used in much of Western Europe.87 This will
potentially free resources for Congress to facilitate administrative oversight
in two ways. First, it would enhance Congressional resources to properly
draft and effectuate bipartisan legislation with proper instruction given to
adequately guide agencies as they undertake the rulemaking process.
Second, it would increase the likelihood of Congress enacting, amending,
or repealing legislation as needed and minimize the pressure on agencies to,
in effect, fill the legislative void by way of agency rulemakings and
guidance memos that, at times, undermine separation of powers and lead to
administrative overreach. Examples of Congressional paralysis leading to
ostensible administrative overreach include, among many items: 1)
Congress’s failure to adequately draft the ACA, which has resulted in
perceived administrative overreach; and 2) failure to reach a bipartisan
compromise on immigration, which precipitated President Obama’s illegal
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) Executive Order and
President Trump’s equally illegal purported DACA repeal.
With respect to the ACA, a Democratic Congress drafted and
enacted the legislation without any Republican support in the House of
Representatives that, at the time, had a 257-199 Democratic majority.88 This
lopsided majority was due to the 2006 and 2008 Democratic “wave”
elections resulting from, among other things, public disapproval of the Bush
Administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina, its handling of the Iraq
war, and the Financial Crisis that followed Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in
87. See Mohamed Akram Faizer, Resurrecting Congress to Reduce
Administrative Chaos: Redressing Administrative Overreach by Increasing the
Number of Congressmen and Ending Single-Member Plurality Districting, 14
TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 19, 34, 50 (2019).
88. Gary Price & Tim Norbeck, A Look Back at How the President was Able
to Sign Obamacare into Law Four Years Ago, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/physiciansfoundation/2014/03/26/a-look-back-athow-the-president-was-able-to-sign-obamacare-into-law-four-yearsago/?sh=64783199526b [https://perma.cc/S3ZU-EC9B].
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September 2008. Unfortunately, these wave elections came at the expense
of moderate Republicans who might have cooperated with Democrats to
enact an effective health care compromise. Eventually, 219 Representatives
voted for the ACA while 212 voted against, with no Republicans voting for
the measure.89 This and the fact the law was enacted via reconciliation to
avoid a Senate filibuster created the perception that the ACA was a hyperpartisan piece of social welfare legislation that was “shoved down the
throats” of the American public.90
If a larger House had been elected via proportional representation,
many moderate Republicans would have been elected after the 2008
election who may well have constructively cooperated with Democrats to
arrive at a final, better drafted, less mistake-prone piece of legislation. Two
obvious errors are worthy of mention. First, Speaker Pelosi, Congressional
Democrats, and the Obama Administration never anticipated states would
refuse to cooperate with federal officials in effectuating the Medicaid
expansion because it was almost entirely paid for by the federal
government.91 As such, neither Congressional Democrats nor the Obama
White House anticipated the provision requiring states to expand their
Medicaid rolls to cover all individuals whose incomes are below 138% of
federal poverty guidelines would be: (1) objected to by attorney generals in
“red” leaning states; and (2) found to be improperly coercive on state
governments and therefore in violation of state sovereignty, as confirmed
by the U.S. Constitution’s Tenth Amendment.92 The Supreme Court’s
decision to remedy this defect, allowing recalcitrant states to opt-out of the
Medicaid expansion while leaving the rest of the law intact, led most “red
state” legislatures to reject federal funding to expand their Medicaid
programs due to political polarization on the issue.93 This problematically

89. Shailagh Murrary & Lori Montgomery, House Passes Health-Care
Reform Bill Without Republican Votes, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2010),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/21/AR2010032100943.html [https://perma.cc/9BMQLBMX].
90. Price & Norbeck, supra note 88.
91. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 2001,
124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012), superseded by Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Mark Hall, Do States Regret
Expanding Medicaid?, BROOKINGS: USC-BROOKINGS SCHAEFFER ON HEALTH
POLICY (Mar. 26, 2018) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaefferon-health-policy/2018/03/26/do-states-regret-expanding-medicaid/
[https://perma.cc/L7K8-HD34].
92. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581–82 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J.).
93. Id. at 585. See generally Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions:
Interactive Map, KFF (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/
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created an adverse selection phenomenon in the ACA’s “red state”
healthcare exchanges, causing insurance companies to cease participation in
and exit these marketplaces because high-risk, low income individuals
Congress anticipated would be covered under the Medicaid expansion,
lacked the ability to do and instead sought coverage under the exchanges.94
The other drafting error in the ACA was seen textually when it
authorized tax credits to be provided for insurance plans purchased
“through an Exchange established by the State” when Congress’s intent was
to authorize tax credits for policies purchased on both state and federal
exchanges.95 The Supreme Court’s resolution of this dispute, in the
Government’s favor, based on the “central importance to the statutory
scheme” test is outlined above and posits a series of problems for the
federal judiciary should it or Congress force an abandonment of Chevron in
the future.
The ACA’s enactment and implementation is a paradigmatic
example of the difficulties in passing well-drafted social welfare legislation
in a hyper-polarized and understaffed Congress. Had there been more
Representatives elected via proportional representation, the first casualties
of the Democratic “wave” elections of 2006 and 2008 would not
necessarily have been moderate Republicans. Proportional representationbased districting would have left in place many moderate members of the
G.O.P caucus who would have been feasible partners in a healthcare
compromise. Additionally, the Democratic leadership would have, most
likely, been less partisan and more inclined to work with Republican
moderates to craft a bipartisan, tighter, and less error-prone piece of
legislation. Had this been achieved, the issue of administrative overreach
may never have arisen.
Another paradigmatic example of administrative overreach by
Executive Order is DACA, which purported to defer deportation and grant
lawful presence benefits to unauthorized migrants who were brought to the
U.S. as minors.96 The massive increase in unauthorized migration since the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 stemmed from the development of
[https://perma.cc/G7P2-V26C] (showing that, as of November 2, 2020, 14 states
had not expanded their Medicaid programs in practice).
94. Olga Khazan, Why So Many Insurers are Leaving Obamacare: How
Rejecting Medicaid and Other Government Decisions Have Hurt Insurance
Markets, ATLANTIC (May 11, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2017/05/why-so-many-insurers-are-leaving-obamacare/526137/ [https://perma.cc/S
HJ6-UQCH].
95. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (a)–(b) (2018).
96. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the
United States as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PNZ9-GYU8].
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a world migratory route from Central America to the west and southwest of
the U.S.97 DACA was enacted only after the House of Representatives
repeatedly failed to act on a Senate compromise, which would have
regularized the status of many unauthorized migrants and even provided
them an earned pathway to citizenship.98 Congressional immobility was a
concomitant of the political polarization and partisan districting that led
House Republicans to effectively veto immigration compromises that were
proposed during both the second Bush and Obama Administrations.99 It also
explains Congressional Democrats’ refusal to enhance border security to
minimize future unauthorized migration or expand the country’s temporary
guest worker program.100 An immigration compromise, such as the one
proposed by the Senate Gang of Eight, might have been feasible had there
been a larger House of Representatives elected in a manner to protect, as
opposed to, undermine moderates. Such a compromise would have, of
course, preempted the DACA and any discussion of administrative
overreach on the issue.
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California,101 points to the importance of administrative proceduralism and
the effectuation of “hard look” review to insulate the professional civil
service from illegitimate political pressure. In DHS, the Court invalidated
the DACA rescission order on the grounds it failed to satisfy “hard look”
review, notwithstanding a change in Presidential Administration, because:
1) the agency’s purported reasons for the rescission consisted primarily of
“post hoc” rationalizations that undermine agency accountability; 2) DHS
treated the Attorney General’s illegality conclusion regarding DACA’s
provision of lawful presence benefits to unauthorized migrants as sufficient
to rescind both benefits and forbearance of deportation, without explaining
why it failed to consider only forbearance as an alternative policy; and 3)
97. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act, amendments, Pub. L. No.
89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); Chris Huber, Central America migration: Facts,
FAQs, and How to Help, WORLD VISION (May 3, 2019), https://www.worldvision.
org/refugees-news-stories/central-america-migration-facts [https://perma.cc/7M66URC3].
98. Key Provisions in “Ganga of Eight” Senate Proposal, WASH. POST (Apr.
15,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/senatorsimmigration-legislation-provisions/ [https://perma.cc/LC68-9XFK].
99. See generally Why Immigration Reform Died in Congress, CBS NEWS
(July 1, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/why-immigrationreform-died-congress-n145276 [https://perma.cc/ZUB5-BNKS] (discussing the
House Republicans blocking immigration reform in 2013–2014).
100. Peter Beinart, How the Democrats Lost Their Way on Immigration,
ATLANTIC (Jul.–Aug. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/0
7/the-democrats-immigration-mistake/528678/
[https://perma.cc/XEF8-GJSE]
(discussing Democrats’ immigration policy stances).
101. See generally Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. 18-587, slip op. at 29 (591 U.S. ___ (2020)).
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DHS arbitrarily and capriciously failed to consider legitimate reliance
interests on the original DACA Memorandum by failing to weigh them
against competing policy concerns.102
DACA’s travails, in short, demonstrate the public policy imperative
of maintaining administrative law as a means of insulating agency
administrators from the political whims of a hyper-polarized Congress and
a uniquely unqualified, illiberal and authoritarian President. It also
evidences the importance of the APA’s purported tripartite division of
administrative responsibilities into legislative, prosecutorial, and judicial
spheres. The fact that DACA was implemented and purportedly rescinded
via Presidential executive order evidences the attendant risks to institutional
sclerosis and democratic retrogression demonstrated by Congressional
immobility in conjunction with executive branch overreach on the
immigration issue. The arbitrariness of the purported rescission points to
the importance of judicial review as a means of supplementing agency
deference doctrines and evidences agency deference is neither rule by
agency fiat, nor a license to administrative overreach. Rather, it is designed
to insulate agencies from improper political influence in effectuating
methodical agency decision making consistent with the rule of law.
III. HARRIS – A DISMISSIVE REPLY
My good friend Professor Faizer presents several interesting
arguments, none of which are ultimately persuasive. Our current
administrative state is neither constitutional nor desirable.
First, Professor Faizer notes the Framers’ own separation of powers
was not complete, citing the impeachment power, the veto, the override of
the veto, and the Senate’s power to ratify treaties and consent (or not) to the
appointment of high national officials.103 True enough. But I must point out
the provisions Professor Faizer cites are designed to operate as checks by
one branch upon another. Far from combining powers, they proceed from
the premise that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition,” as
Madison famously said in Federalist 51,104 to ensure that no one branch
becomes ascendant.
Even if these constitutional provisions (or others) are interpreted as
mixing legislative, executive, and judicial functions, the Framers implicitly
forbade any further such mixing. As the Supreme Court noted when it
rejected the legislative veto, the Constitution contains a “finely wrought”
procedure for the legislative process, which neither Congress nor the
President can change. United States v. Chadha.105 Fifteen years later, citing
102. Id. at 15, 23, 26.
103. Id.
104. FEDERALIST 51, supra note 20.
105. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). This was no small matter. As
Justice White noted, “the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration
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Chadha, the Court rejected the line-item veto in Clinton v. City of New
York.106 Between publishing its decisions in Chadha and Clinton, the Court
rejected a federal statute which purported to re-open final federal judgments
as violating the separation of powers. 107 Taken together, these cases stand
for the broad proposition that, to the extent the Framers wanted one branch
to impinge upon the powers of another, they said so—and if they didn’t say
so, it’s unconstitutional.
Second, Professor Faizer points out the many strengths of the APA
(and the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act108) in removing undue
political influence from the rulemaking process. Good. My proposal would
keep them in place—civil service protections, technical expertise, public
input—but would add the ultimate requirement of congressional enactment
and political accountability.
Third, Professor Faizer makes the point that (in my words)
Madison was not a demigod, nor were the other Framers. Agreed. We
should not slavishly follow the path laid out for us by rich, white,
eighteenth-century men. Their Constitution was flawed, most notably in its
denial of equality and its protection of slavery. But let’s not reject the good
ideas because of the bad. Separation of powers was, and remains, a good
idea, despite the fact that the men who came up with it wore knee breeches
and wigs. As Madison said in Federalist 51:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory
provisions in which Congress has reserved a ‘legislative veto.’ For this reason, the
Court's decision is of surpassing importance.” Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
106. “There are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence on this
profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition. The procedures
governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the
product of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself.
Familiar historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the
power to enact statutes may only ‘be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.’” Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417, 439–40 (1998) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951).
107. Plaut v. Spendthrift Trust, 514 U.S. 211 (1995). The Court was clear
about the dangers of mixing governmental powers: “The Framers of our
Constitution lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and
judicial powers, which had been prevalent in the colonies long before the
Revolution, and which after the Revolution had produced factional strife and
partisan oppression.” Id. at 219. The Court concluded by quoting Robert Frost:
“Separation of powers, a distinctively American political doctrine, profits from the
advice authored by a distinctively American poet: Good fences make good
neighbors.” Id. at 240.
108. Civil Service (Pendleton) Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
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government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.109
That’s what separation of powers was designed to do, and, by and large, it
has succeeded, despite the congressional and judicial abdications of the past
150 years.
It is true that our Constitution has not prevented many of the abuses
of the current administration, but it has prevented some. The recent
impeachment proceedings slowed those abuses, even if it did not stop them,
and so have various federal court orders, including the DACA decision
Professor Faizer cites above.110 By effectively eliminating Chevron
deference, my proposal would make it even easier for the judiciary to check
the executive, as Madison intended. Every system of government is subject
to the imperfections of those who inhabit it. People are not angels.
Fourth, Professor Faizer cites Francis Fukuyama. At the risk of
being glib, I stopped listening to Fukuyama in 1992 when he proclaimed
the end of history.111 It’s been almost thirty years. Lots of history has
happened since then, most of it hostile to liberal democracy.112 And yes, I
realize that Fukuyama was talking about competing ideologies, and his
conviction that liberal democracy would emerge the eventual victor, at least
in the long term. I hope he’s right. But I note that long-term predictions are
notoriously inaccurate (I’m still waiting for nuclear fusion and flying cars),
and therefore of little value to the current generation. In the immortal words
of John Maynard Keynes, “[i]n the long run we are all dead.”113 In the
meantime, authoritarian ideology is on the rise. Our own Republican Party
recently declined to draft a specific platform for the 2020 election, instead
issuing the blanket assertion “[t]hat the Republican Party has and will
continue to enthusiastically support the President’s America-first
agenda.”114 What is such a platform, if not an open-ended statement of
109. FEDERALIST 51, supra note 20.
110. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18-587 slip
op. at 29 (591 U.S. ___ (2020)).
111. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN
(Macmillan 1992).
112. I was irritated then, and I am irritated now, with those who proclaim the
triumphant victory of the West in the Cold War. The Soviet Union may be gone,
but the Russian Empire remains, and it remains hostile to liberal democracy. And
China is positively Orwellian.
113. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80
(Macmillan & Co. 1923).
114. As Adopted by the Republican National Committee, Resolution Regarding
the Republican Party Platform (2020), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/docs/
Resolution_Platform_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8TH-GF79].
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nationalism as defined by one leader? One is reminded of the
Führerprinzip.115
Fifth, Professor Faizer references the supposed enhancement of our
democratic values by what Michaels calls “the administrative separation of
powers” within the Executive Branch.116 If we were to observe the
constitutionally mandated separation of powers, there would be no need to
supplement it by further dividing the Executive Branch. In any event, my
own (admittedly limited) experience with administrative practice suggests
the opposite of democratic value enhancement. As a practitioner, I saw
agencies dominated by the very industries they were supposed to regulate,
staffed by bureaucrats whose sole ambition seemed to be a stroll through
the revolving door to a cushy industry job, all of which was enabled by a
byzantine structure largely invisible to the public. Who reads the Federal
Register? Industry lawyers do; most common citizens do not even know
what it is. This results in the Kafkaesque system we have, where, by the
time the public learns of an agency action, it is a fait accompli, where
challenges are not only lengthy and expensive but useless.
There are also major due process issues with the current system.
The primary problem is the implicit biases of ALJs.117 Beyond that, the lack
of uniformity in the procedures followed in administrative hearings,
especially informal hearings, is an invitation to abuse by litigants and
arbitrariness by tribunals. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, modified
and improved over decades, exist for a reason. We should use them in
federal court. In any event, my proposal would not eliminate what little
good the APA may do for democratic values. My proposal would enhance
those values by giving the public additional points of entry through both the
political process and the federal courts.
Sixth, Professor Faizer defends Chevron deference. My proposal
would effectively eliminate Chevron deference, and good riddance. I am all
for agency expertise, so long as it is used only in an advisory capacity. If I
have a medical condition, I will seek out expert advice, but the ultimate
choice of treatment is mine. I might look for second or third opinions. I
don’t want to be bound by the advice of a company doctor, or one who
happens to be in my health insurance network. Similarly, we should not be
bound by agency decisions. Our elected representatives should question,
and in appropriate cases, reject them.

115. Geoffrey Megargee, Hitler’s Leadership Style, BBC (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_commander_01.shtml
[https://perma.cc/P8NS-5R6P].
116. See generally Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of
Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (2015) (referencing “the administrative
separation of powers”).
117. Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication
Should Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023 (2017).
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Again, this is not a conservative or liberal issue. To cite just one
timely example, we should all value the expertise of our federal health
agencies in fighting the global pandemic—right up to the moment when
they clearly have been corrupted by political forces.118 We should not cloak
the actions of corrupted agencies with any kind of deference.
Seventh, Professor Faizer points out that, currently, Congress
would not be able to effectively review the thousands of proposed rules that
my proposal would send its way. I agree. Fortunately, Professor Faizer
himself has suggested several solutions which would restore some of
Congress’ eroded powers and better enable it to perform its legislative
function.119 Among them, I embrace the simplest: creating more House
seats and significantly increasing Congress’s budget and staff. Many hands
make light work.
Moreover, some rulemakings are more important than others. I
expect that many would end up on Congress’ consent calendars, and
appropriately so. Only the most important rules should receive extensive
hearings and debate. But all such rules, even those approved by a largely
pro forma procedure, would be fodder for the next election. Congress
would have to answer for them.
One can make a similar lack-of-resources argument for the federal
courts. My proposal would increase their caseload considerably. So what?
Hire more judges. Build more courthouses. The federal judiciary is already
understaffed and underfunded.120 My proposal presents an opportunity to
rectify that. As for the alleged lack of administrative expertise in the federal
judiciary, I must point out that most federal judges are quite versatile, and
administrative law is no more complex than contracts or torts, and no more
challenging than constitutional law. Even if some areas of administrative
law would benefit from specialized courts, well, then create them. We
already have specialized tax courts, federal claims courts, and national
security courts.121 We can do the same for, e.g., workplace safety or social
security disability claims—if, again, such specialization is truly needed.

118. Laurie McGinley et al., Inside Trump’s pressure campaign on federal
scientists over a covid-19 treatment, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/convalescent-plasma-treatment-covid19fda/2020/08/29/e39a75ec-e935-11ea-bc79-834454439a44_story.html
[https://perma.cc/WR89-4SWU].
119. Faizer, supra note 87.
120. Cara Bayles, These Are The Nation’s 27 Most Overworked District
Courts, LAW 360 IN-DEPTH (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/113
9833/these-are-the-nation-s-27-most-overworked-district-courts [https://perma.cc/
WD5H-2WB7].
121. E.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511,
92 Stat. 1783.
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IV. FAIZER – THE LAST WORD
Professor Harris’s warm-hearted formalism is on display when he
cites to Chadha and Plaut. Both decisions are extremely conservative and
actually worsen the problem of agency unaccountability. To illustrate,
Chadha was a Supreme Court decision that invalidated an ostensible
separation of powers transgression by the legislative branch when Congress
enacted a unicameral legislative veto to nullify administrative deferrals of
deportation. Notice, however, the Court’s formalism has needlessly
corroded Congressional capacity to oversee the government. To his credit,
Professor Harris is supportive of civil service retention and professionalism.
That said, the benefits of a professional and highly capable civil service
would be undermined by taking away rulemaking authority and procedural
rules, including deference doctrines, that are designed to enhance the
quality of government professionalism.
We agree on the current administration’s parlous approach to the
rule of law. While I do agree that the other branches of government have
slowed down various White House abuses, my concern is that the current
administration is, facilitated by its allies who oppose the administrative
state, undermining bureaucratic competence and the rule of law. An
obvious example is the U.S. Justice Department under Attorney General
Barr, who has consistently used his power to further Presidential impunity.
Barr systematically mischaracterized the Mueller Report’s conclusions to
Congress and the public to enable the President and his supporters to
characterize the Investigation into Russian Election Interference as a
“hoax.” They subsequently used Barr’s mischaracterizations of the Report
to avoid accountability for his subsequent abuses of power, including the
Ukraine matter that led to the President’s impeachment by Congress and the
Administration’s parlous, White House-coerced response to the COVID-19
pandemic.
Professor Harris derides my citation to Fukuyama. I certainly
invited this because what has become paradigmatic in reading scholarship
on the current state of western democracy and the rule of law is the
frequency of incorrect criticisms of Fukuyama and his 1992 book, “The
End of History and the Last Man,” which posited that, at the Cold War’s
End, western democracy’s lack of ideological competitors meant that we
had collectively arrived at a Hegelian ideological endpoint.122 No doubt, his
critics, including Professor Harris, point to worldwide authoritarianism,
democratic retrogression, and ethno-nationalism to claim the passage of
time has proven Fukuyama wrong. They, however, misrepresent Fukuyama,
who never said that western democracy had achieved perfection. Rather, he
concluded that liberal democracy would no longer face a serious ideological
competitor as was the case with totalitarian communism during the Cold
122. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 111.
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War.123 Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that few westerners truly believe
that ideologies hostile to western liberalism, such as the authoritarian
nationalism found in China, Hungary, and Russia today, are indeed
preferable to democratic liberalism and the rule of law.124 Where
Fukuyama’s 1992 book arguably fell short is its failure to recognize that
liberal democracy’s lack of ideological competition risked leading to its
own corrosion and decay. This is indeed what makes his more recent
scholarship so illuminating and explains my reference to his work.
Professor Harris makes an excellent point about agency capture. A
paradigmatic example is the Federal Aviation Administration under
President Trump. The FAA’s failures to protect passenger safety is directly
attributable to Congress and the White House whittling down its autonomy
to regulate under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. In short, the source
of the problem did not start with the FAA, but unbridled political and
financial pressure brought on Congress and the White House to hamstring
the agency and make it effectively beholden to Boeing.125
Professor Harris’s position adumbrates potential support of the
Congressional Review Act (“CRA”)126 and the Regulations from the
Executive in Need of Scrutiny (“REINS”) Act.127 Both are unworkable and
ill-advised. The CRA was enacted in 1996 and requires agencies to submit
all major regulations to Congress before they become effective.128 Under
the CRA, Congress has 60 legislative days to pass a joint resolution of
disapproval, which would keep the regulation from going into effect.129
This is a manifestly unworkable and illegitimate paradigm, largely because
the Congressional coalition that enacted the original legislation may not be
in place to veto an illegitimate final rulemaking. Also, it is entirely
infeasible for the entire Congress to review all rulemakings, especially
since there are nearly 4,000 rulemakings issued each year, compared to
only 250 or so pieces of legislation that are annually signed into law.130

123. Id.
124. Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
391, 395 (2015).
125. Niraj Chokshi, House Report Condemns Boeing and F.A.A. in 737 Max
Disasters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/16/
business/boeing-737-max-house-report.html [https://perma.cc/6X2M-XQ8S].
126. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 801–808 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193).
127. Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011, H.R.
10, 112th Cong. (2011).
128. Major regulations are those with an annual impact of at least $100 million
to the U.S. economy.
129. 5 U.S.C.A. § 802 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193).
130. Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., How Many Rules and Regulations Do Federal
Agencies Issue?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
waynecrews/2017/08/15/how-many-rules-and-regulations-do-federal-agenciesissue/?sh=358e75071e64 [https://perma.cc/8Y2Z-UZD5].
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The CRA has been proven ineffective. To illustrate, between 1996
and 2008, agencies submitted nearly 48,000 final rules to Congress and a
mere 47 joint resolutions of disapproval, regarding 35 rules, were
introduced.131 A grand total of one regulation has been disapproved. This
was OSHA’s “ergonomics rule,” which was finalized at the end of the
Clinton Administration and jointly disapproved by both Houses of the
subsequent Congress and President George W. Bush.132 The evidence
demonstrates that agencies have adopted “an attitude of nonchalance”
toward the CRA.133
Recognizing infirmities with the CRA, and the infeasibility of
requiring Congress to anticipate all issues facing agencies via legislative
drafting, there is a temptation to have the newly empowered House of
Representatives require responsible congressional committees to
affirmatively approve proposed final rulemakings prior to implementation.
The problem is sheer volume of agency rulemakings would easily
overwhelm even a better resourced Congress.
Unlike the CRA, which requires joint disapproval of a proposed
major regulation, the REINS Act reverses this presumption and instead
requires affirmative joint bicameral approval for all proposed rulemakings
prior to implementation. The problem, once again, is that Congress would
be overwhelmed by the task, thereby creating a bottleneck effect that would
preclude timely implementation of necessary rulemakings.
This country is well-served by what Michaels correctly describes as
the tripartite division of administrative responsibilities under the
Administrative Procedure Act. This division has updated American
governmental capacity and improved upon the gaps in Madison’s
constitutional framework, which had resulted in an American government
that was incapable of adapting to the industrial age. Should Professor
Harris’s positions be adopted–an end to agency rulemaking, adjudication,
and deference doctrines–governmental incapacity will ensue. This would
not result in some Rousseauian state of nature, but a brutal world where
resources are allocated based on social hierarchy, economic insecurity, and
the ever-present fear of retaliation by those in power. It is a result we must
avoid.
CONCLUSION
Professor Faizer argues that Administrative law, the APA, and
agency deference doctrines have been unfairly maligned by Professor
131. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 84 (7th ed. 2011).
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG,
RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 141
(3rd ed. 2003)).
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Harris. Big hearted liberal that he is, Professor Harris’s concerns about the
administrative state and agency deference, though understandable, cannot
be feasibly addressed without enfeebling American government capacity to
address the broader regulatory and administrative needs of a heterogeneous,
continent-sized industrial democracy. If anything, the APA and agency
deference doctrines need to be updated to account for the country’s shift
from the industrial superpower that it was at the time of the APA’s
enactment to the multiethnic, information-age country of today with
pronounced inequalities that the government struggles to remediate.
Professor Harris, however, would argue that administrative law
currently renders individual citizens powerless when confronting
government power in the form of administrative agencies, emboldened by
their vast budgets and adjudicatory powers. He would say that objecting
citizens, who are caught in the maelstrom of administrative chaos, are
treated as recalcitrant subjects, and not citizens, for daring to object to a
monographic regulatory ratchet that is furthered by expensive, and often
biased, agency adjudications and appeals that are reflexively affirmed by
Article III courts based on agency deference doctrines. Professor Faizer
would not disagree with Professor Harris that these are problems. Rather,
he would conjecture, based on evidence and history, that Professor Harris’s
remedy, which is to end all agency rulemaking, adjudication, and deference
doctrines, would create far more problems than anticipated. Professor
Faizer would argue that Professor Harris’s solution would unintentionally
worsen the problem of governmental incapacity that is already undermining
the quality of American democracy and explains much of the
authoritarianism that has seeped into the political culture in recent years. It
would also result in a regressive allocation of government and private
sector resources based on traditional social hierarchies, corporate power,
and an ever-present fear of retaliation and social exclusion, as opposed to
an allocation based on inclusion and the rule of law.
At the end of the day, though, both Professors Harris and Faizer
hope for a better and more inclusive world, one where Americans of all
backgrounds, sexual identities, colors, and creeds are full and equal citizens
with access to education, jobs, and resources consistent with living in the
world’s leading democracy. Their disagreement is born of a warm-hearted
idealism and a hope for a better, more inclusive, and successful country. It
is explained by the great abolitionist and Unitarian Minister, Theodore
Parker, who in an 1853 sermon, wrote, “I do not pretend to understand the
moral universe; the arc is a long one, my eye reaches but little ways; I
cannot calculate the curve and complete the figure by the experience of
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sight; I can divine it by conscience. And from what I see I am sure it bends
towards justice.”134

134. Theodore Parker And The ‘Moral Universe’, NPR (Sept. 2, 2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129609461
[https://perma.cc/5GWB-AS3E].

